INC-2025-0006SEV3 · Medium (potential)Prompt injectionDemonstrated

Support ticket text steers a coding agent into leaking private database tables

General Analysis showed that instructions hidden in a support ticket could make a coding agent with a privileged Supabase key read a private table and write its contents back into the ticket.

Demonstrated. Demonstrated by researchers. No real-world exploitation confirmed. The severity shown is potential.

Disclosed
Published
Organization
Supabase
System
Cursor agent using the Supabase MCP server
Impact
Demonstrated leak of a private table on dummy data; no customer leak reported

Timeline

  • 2025-07-08. General Analysis publishes its demonstration.
  • 2025-09-16. Supabase publishes its approach to securing MCP.

Trigger or entry point

A customer support ticket that contains instructions addressed to the developer’s agent.

Failure mechanism

A developer asks the agent in Cursor to show the latest open ticket. The agent reads the ticket through the Supabase MCP server and follows the instructions in it. The MCP server runs SQL with the service_role key, which bypasses row-level security. The agent reads a table of integration tokens and inserts its contents as a new message in the ticket, where the attacker can read it. Each step on its own was an ordinary action for the agent: reading a ticket, running a query, writing a message. The developer only asked to see the latest ticket.

Impact

The demonstration used a new project with dummy data. Supabase states that there has been “no reported incident” of a customer leaking data through MCP. The severity is potential.

Response

Supabase wrote that its guardrails reduced the risk but did not eliminate it. It added that “guardrails alone aren’t enough” and described further work, including more granular access token scopes and a mode intended for production use.

Mitigations

Supabase lists a read-only mode, scoping the server to one project, manual approval of tool calls, and using MCP with non-production data. It also recommends monitoring and logging the queries that MCP clients run.

Engineering takeaway

Failure pattern
A coding agent held a database key that bypasses row-level security while reading text written by customers.
Preventive control
Give agents read-only, project-scoped database access and never a key that bypasses access rules.
Transferable lesson
If the agent can read customer text and run privileged queries in one session, the customer can run those queries.

Editorial summary by Incidents.si, drawn from the sourced record above. It is not a statement by the organizations involved.

Sources

  1. Supabase MCP can leak your entire SQL databaseprimary · 2025-07-08
  2. Defense in Depth for MCP Serversprimary · 2025-09-16

Corrections

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